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Campus Safety

Assessing and Managing Threats

By Mario Scalora, Ph.D., Andre Simons, M.A., and Shawn VanSlyke, J.D.

S

ince the shootings
at Virginia Tech,
academic institutions and police departments have dedicated
substantial resources
to alleviating concerns
regarding campus safety.
The incident in Blacksburg and the similar tragedy at Northern Illinois
University have brought
renewed attention to the
prevention of violence at
colleges and universities.
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Campus professionals
must assess the risk posed by
known individuals, as well as
by anonymous writers of threatening communications. The
authors offer threat assessment
and management strategies to
address the increased demands
faced by campus law enforcement, mental health, and administration officials who assess
and manage threats, perhaps
several simultaneously.1
A CHALLENGE
Campus police departments
have come under increasing
pressure to address targeted
violence and related threatening
activity. College and university grounds often are porous,
vulnerable to various types of
threats (e.g., stalking, domestic
violence, and other activities
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conducted by disturbed or
disgruntled students and employees) from both internal and
external sources.
The campus safety professional must deal both reactively
and proactively with these
numerous threats. As much of
the current literature concerning
campus violence has focused on
the elementary and high school
levels, campus safety officials
often must rely on data and research related to a younger age
demographic operating in less
diverse physical environments.
Campus law enforcement
and safety agencies often are
small compared with urban police departments, yet they operate within large, active communities. Further, campus safety
officials must work with a variety of stakeholders, including

Special Agent Simons serves
with the FBI’s Behavioral
Analysis Unit-1, Critical
Incident Response Group.

faculty, staff, administrators,
students, and community members, and coordinate with law
enforcement agencies responsible for the overall jurisdiction
within which the institution is
located. The campus safety
official must accomplish all of
this while preserving the tenets
of an academic environment
that values debate, free expression, and creativity. Unfortunately, the effort may be complicated by the fact that some
people view law enforcement
through an adversarial lens
where campus safety measures
conflict with these academic
ideals.
A SOURCE OF HELP
Through the application of
case experience, education, specialized training, and research,

Special Agent VanSlyke
heads the FBI’s Behavioral
Analysis Unit-1, Critical
Incident Response Group.

the FBI’s National Center for
the Analysis of Violent Crime
(NCAVC), part of the Critical Incident Response Group
(CIRG), provides behaviorally
based investigative and operational support to complex and
time-sensitive situations involving violent acts or threats.
Its Behavioral Analysis Unit-1
(BAU-1) assesses the risk of
potential terrorist acts, school
shootings, arsons, bombings,
cyber attacks, and other incidents of targeted violence.
Since April 2007, the unit has
responded to numerous college and university requests to
address cases of potential mass
shooters. However, BAU-1 also
has worked cooperatively with
campus safety officials to craft
effective threat management
strategies pertaining to many
other types of campus-oriented
threats.
• For 20 years, a male subject
with no formal relationship
to or status on a campus but
residing nearby continually
harassed students and staff
and blatantly disregarded
formal requests to stay
away from the grounds.
Recently, he sent a letter
containing hyperreligious
references and veiled
threats to the administration in which he expressed
outrage over the revealing
nature of dress exhibited by
coeds attending services at
his church.

• Extremists targeted a university laboratory because of its
use of animals in research.
Officials became concerned
that one or more insiders set
up the attack and continued
to pose a threat to the safety
of the laboratory, campus,
and staff. University professors engaged in biomedical research received death
threats, including those
targeting their family members, at their residences.

“

College and
university grounds
often are porous,
vulnerable to various
types of threats...from
both internal and
external sources.

”

• College authorities received
a frantic call from a parent
of an incoming freshman
who had found a profile on
a social networking Web
site of his assigned roommate and discovered several
references to bombing the
school and taking mass casualties. When subsequently
confronted, the student of
concern explained that these
simply reflected his creative
side and sense of humor.

• A cheerleader advisor at a
large university received an
anonymous letter containing
threats to disrupt collegiate
sporting events and kill
innocent people, including
school children, unless authorities met seemingly bizarre demands, the nature of
which pertained to network
television coverage and the
perceived discrimination
against cheerleader squads
outfitted in sleeveless
tops.
• A human resources specialist reported the potentially
problematic termination
of a disgruntled employee
who allegedly made multiple references to recent
acts of school violence and
commented on how easily
such an incident could occur within the individual’s
own campus. The employee
also reportedly threatened,
“They better not fire me if
they don’t want the same
thing here.”
AN EFFECTIVE
APPROACH
As a policing plan, a collaborative and standardized
threat assessment protocol can
prove valuable in addressing
the various internal and external
threats to campuses. Ideally, it
involves flexible strategies to
evaluate the range of observable
behavioral factors (e.g., identified versus anonymous subject,
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the individual’s motivations).
Threat assessment methodology
considers contextual, target- and
subject-specific, and behavioral
factors to determine the risk of
violence.2 Different from profile-based techniques focused
primarily on subject characteristics, models of this approach
deal more with the interaction
of the perpetrator’s behavior,
the target’s vulnerability, and
related factors.3 Further, threat
assessment differs from various
surveys that evaluate site or asset vulnerabilities.4
A prevention-oriented strategy, threat assessment strives to
accurately identify risks and to
implement appropriate measures designed to minimize the
potential for violence. To this
end, investigators must evaluate the nature of the concerning
(e.g., threatening or agitated)
behaviors; the possible motives
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and nature of the displayed
grievance; and the target’s, or
victim’s, reaction. The nature
and intensity of the threat posed
depends on how far the subject
has escalated along a chain of
behaviors that move from ideation to threatened or problematic action.
Lessons Learned
The experiences of law
enforcement officers, as well as
campus public safety personnel, administrators, and mental
health practitioners, can provide
valuable insight. The authors
offer lessons learned from their
own practice and from threat
assessment literature.
Avoid Tunnel Vision
When planning strategies
to prevent and manage threats,
authorities must recognize that
campuses face them from a

variety of sources, both internal
and external, as indicated by the
incidents addressed by BAU-1.
While much attention focuses
on violent students, public
safety officials should resist a
myopic approach and remain
vigilant to all potential threats,
recognizing that outsiders,
employees, and other consumers of campus services may
pose a threat to safety. Through
comprehensive planning and
collaboration, officials should
anticipate multiple potential
sources of violence and plan
for copycat and hoax activity in
the wake of highly publicized
attacks at other institutions.
While extreme acts of campus
violence are rare, all stakeholders must consider themselves
fortunate but not immune from
the myriad safety concerns that
plague colleges and universities
across the nation.

Recognize Campus Values
Safety policies must respect
institutions as unique environments of higher learning. Acts
of extreme violence often reflect
hatred, intolerance, and bigotry,
and people recognize that such
behavior cannot be tolerated
within campus environments.
Scholarship, creativity, and the
fruitful exchange of ideas and
learning could not thrive. Yet,
the actual work of fusing pragmatic security measures with
cherished Promethean ideals
can prove challenging. Through
education and outreach, campuses can allow safety planning
and preparation to flourish
as friends of an open campus
environment.
In recognition of this balance, safety strategies should
be flexible. Rigid policies (e.g.,
zero tolerance) do not necessarily promote secure environments and may contribute to
outlandish applications of discipline that enrage and alienate
the general campus populous.
Administrators should review
harsh disciplinary measures
that may discourage individuals from reporting concerns and
suspicions for fear a coworker
or fellow student will face unjust punishment.
Communication must flow
freely between consumers and
providers. Students, faculty,
and employees first must
fully understand the mission
of public safety before they

can cooperate with and support
it. Therefore, administrators
and campus law enforcement
personnel should seek opportunities to provide campus
consumers with information
concerning threat assessment
reporting protocols, as well as
information concerning confidentiality. Authorities should
consider facilitating confidential
reporting opportunities via text
messaging, e-mail, and other
Web-based resources. Attackers

“

...a collaborative
and standardized
threat assessment
protocol can
prove valuable
in addressing the
various...threats to
campuses.

”

typically do not make direct
threats to the targets, but they
often “leak” their intentions to
a range of bystanders. Perpetrators with hostile aspirations
often manifest concerning behaviors, including ominous and
menacing verbal statements;
violent-themed content posted
on social networking sites; and
written assignments saturated
with hatred, despair, and rage.
Maximizing and streamlining

the opportunities for these bystanders to recognize and report
troubling behaviors remains one
of the essential challenges faced
by campus safety professionals.
Assess Threatening
Communications
Assessing threatening or
intimidating communications
does not stifle creativity but,
rather, represents a key aspect
of maintaining a safe campus.
Sometimes, faculty members
may encounter disturbing or
violent text or imagery from
students while reviewing course
assignments or conducting other
classroom activities. Several
noteworthy examples exist of
subjects telegraphing or rehearsing violent intentions through
text and video media. Though
not all graphic or violent imagery necessarily predicts an
individual’s actions, campus
personnel should report such
content for a discrete threat assessment. At a minimum, a student could be pleading for help
through such disturbing messages. Faculty members may
feel hesitant to report them for
fear of creating a chilling effect
within the classroom or alienating the student. However, a
discrete threat assessment might
allow campus law enforcement
personnel and other professionals to not only gauge risk but
also work with the faculty to
develop strategies to approach
the student.
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Officials should evaluate
drawings, essays, or videos that
depict extreme acts of hostility, aggression, homicide, or
suicide within the totality of the
circumstances. Examining such
products as part of an overall tapestry or mosaic further
demonstrates the important role
of the threat assessment team
(TAT), which also can consider
other pertinent factors, such as
whether the student has actively
sought to obtain items depicted
in drawings (e.g., trench coats,
weapons, masks).5
For instance, a student
discloses to a mental health
provider a particular resentment toward an individual.
The counselor then learns that
the subject has posted a video
online in which he insults and
disparages the person. A different video features the student
shooting a handgun at a firing
range. In a class assignment,
the same subject writes of his
overwhelming sense of despair
and rage against the wealthy
students at the university. Taken
alone, each of these factors may
not seem particularly dramatic,
but, taken together, the TAT can
begin to fully comprehend the
true level of potential risk posed
by the individual and manage it
effectively.
Share Responsibility
Recognizing the need to
gather information on any particular subject from a variety
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of perspectives, threat management within the campus requires participation from multiple stakeholders, including,
among others, student affairs,
faculty, administrators, mental
health care providers, and law
enforcement officers—possibly municipal, considering the
blended boundaries that often
exist between on- and off-campus facilities. No single agency
or other entity can manage the
range of threats posed to university and college settings.

campus, complemented by separate TATs designed to address
long-term follow-up issues,
such as treatment compliance
and reintegration.
A TAT with diverse representation often will operate
more efficiently and effectively.
In one case, the BAU-1 evaluated a university student who,
in the months following the
shootings at Virginia Tech, had
engaged in increasingly bizarre
behaviors, to include the torturing of animals. The subject
had collected photographs of
friends and drawn target circles
around the head and face of one
individual. The student made
numerous disturbing statements
that included claiming he was
the best shot in the state and
asserting that he would be “the
next Virginia Tech.” Perhaps
most disturbing, he had constructed a makeshift shooting
range in his backyard for target
practice.
The college’s TAT had
worked diligently in the months
preceding this incident to
establish lines of communication with external law enforceTATs should contemplate a
ment agencies. Accordingly,
holistic assessment and manage- the TAT activated an external
ment strategy that considers the network of allied agencies to
many aspects of the student’s
identify crisis management
life—academic, residential,
strategies for reducing the
work, and social. Various colleg- potential for violence. Mental
es and universities have recoghealth practitioners and law
nized the complexity of campus enforcement officers and agents
life and created teams designed representing university, local,
to deal with crisis situations on
and federal organizations

instantly collaborated to design
and implement an intervention
strategy. Campus and municipal
law enforcement officials
located and interviewed the
subject, then discovered that he
had procured a semiautomatic
handgun and a rifle. The student
agreed to be voluntarily committed to a hospital for a mental
health evaluation. Although he
later revoked his permission,
doctors had witnessed such
disturbing behavior during their
time with him that full commitment was authorized. One
doctor considered the subject a
“time bomb” who undoubtedly
would have perpetrated an act
of violence had the TAT not intervened. While this student was
clearly engaged in disturbing
behavior, the decision to intervene was enabled by preexisting
channels of communication that
facilitated a rapid and effective
response.

In the authors’ experience,
a direct but generic communicated threat to commit campus
violence on a certain date (e.g.,
“I’m going to kill everyone in
this library on May 9!”) rarely
materializes. By alerting public
safety officials of their intent
and the date of the attack, a
threatener sets off a predictable chain of events resulting
in additional security measures

Pinpoint Dangerous
Individuals
Authorities should focus
time and effort on individuals who actually pose a threat.
Consistent across several
studies and a central tenet of
threat assessment literature—
although some perpetrators may
alert third parties or, perhaps,
even their target—threatened
violence does not necessarily
predict that an individual ultimately will engage in the act.6

(e.g., bomb dogs, check points,
evacuations) that ultimately
reduces the chance for success.
Therefore, a communicated
threat announcing the plan
generally proves counterproductive to the plan itself. Of course,
authorities must take all threats
seriously and investigate them
to the fullest feasible extent.
However, campus safety professionals should remain aware of
the clear distinction between
threateners and attackers.

“

...threat assessment
strives to accurately
identify risks and to
implement appropriate
measures designed
to minimize the
potential for violence.

”

Do Not Rely on Expulsion
Except as a last resort and
unless absolutely necessary to
ensure campus safety, authorities should avoid the temptation to simply expel students
of concern to quickly resolve a
risk. Isolated from other contingency and safety planning, this
strategy sometimes can worsen
matters. The final humiliation of
expulsion may serve as a precipitating, or triggering, stressor
in the subject’s life and propel
the marginalized and hostile individual toward violence. Even
after they physically remove
the subject from the campus,
officials will find it difficult,
if not impossible, to prevent a
determined student from returning. While expulsion remains an
option, authorities must carefully consider the ramifications
and limitations of such an
action.
Students requiring discipline
often can receive monitoring
through mental health or other
resources mandated by campus
student services or judicial affairs offices more easily if not
thrust unwillingly into the unstructured outside environment.
Short of subjects displaying
some extremely troubling behaviors that warrant immediate
expulsion, campus professionals
and law enforcement officers
may collaborate to monitor such
individuals on a probationary
status. Officials should consider

February 2010 / 7

the potential for such monitoring
on a case-by-case basis.
Rather than isolating the
subject and possibly exacerbating existing grievances, university officials can explore ways
to integrate the student into an
environment where monitoring and treatment coexist with
safety and security. For instance,
authorities can make appropriate referrals, with follow-up, to
social services, mental health,
and psychological counseling resources. Although officials must
ensure the overall safety of the
campus, they can benefit from
a supervised integration, rather
than isolation, of the individual.
Doing so allows them to put the
student into a supportive educational environment and to monitor, reinforce, and adjust interventional treatment strategies.

© iStockphoto.com
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Also, in certain cases
involving a student separated
from the university, authorities
should consider reintegrating the individual, provided
the maintenance of appropriate safeguards. Presumably,
students who suffer from a
serious physical or medical
condition will have the approval to pause studies, receive treatment, and return to
classes with full privileges.
While these individuals clearly
present an entirely different
scenario from those who pose
a threat, it may be worthwhile
to consider reintegrating a
student who receives appropriate mental health care,
treatment, and counseling and
who demonstrates a record of
compliance with security and
treatment parameters.

If a subject presents safety
concerns far too serious for
reintegration to the campus
environment, officials should
consider active engagement
in a process to ensure that the
individual is not left adrift and
isolated. While campus authorities do not traditionally take
responsibility for assisting in
students’ lives once they leave
the institution, it seems prudent
to adopt a long-term threatmanagement perspective, collaborate with outside agencies,
and become an active participant in the process to minimize
the potential risk an individual
still could pose to the campus.
Campus safety professionals
should check with legal counsel to verify that such contact
with and monitoring of a former
student is permitted.
Officials may find that some
students are suitable candidates
for nontraditional or creative
arrangements that enhance
security without exacerbating or increasing the risk of
violence. For example, a community college received reports
of disturbing behavior from a
male student making troubling
statements and stalking females.
Although only one semester
from graduating, his behavior
had escalated to the point that
he could not remain on campus.
Expelling this student potentially could have stoked resentment
while simultaneously cutting off
the college’s ability to monitor

his moods, statements, and
behaviors. Thinking creatively,
officials arranged for him to
receive video-recorded copies
of classes at his off-campus
residence. An administrator who
previously had positive interactions with the student and who
had the individual’s trust served
as a primary point of contact.
The administrator maintained
regular interaction with the
student to ensure the completion
of his assignments and, more
important, to gauge his level
of anger and his disposition.
The individual successfully
completed assignments via
e-mail, graduated on time,
and avoided becoming further
disenfranchised as a result of
an expulsion.
Use a Single Point
of Contact
When monitoring cases,
campus safety professionals
should consider providing a single contact (i.e., a “temperature
taker”) to a subject. The initial
intervention with a student may
prove insufficient as additional
follow-up may be necessary. In
some cases, continued monitoring of the subject’s behavior or
communications will be needed.
Either way, someone must have
responsibility for monitoring
or conducting follow-up of the
situation. Given that multiple
campus entities could partner
to provide support, authorities
must ensure communications

The FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit,
part of the Critical Incident Response Group, offers assistance
in conducting threat assessments
and developing risk management
strategies. The unit can be reached
at 703-632-4333.

through various campus educational activities, the TAT
encourages them to do so. In
addition to training sessions to
A Campus Example
encourage prevention and early
Campus authorities can per- reporting, TAT members also
form collaborative threat assess- reach out to human resources
ment and management activities and student affairs staff with
by organizing existing resourcguidelines and criteria for use in
es. It is critical to have one enscreening for problematic
tity responsible for coordinating student or employee issues that
and monitoring situations. The
may raise concerns or warrant
University of Nebraska-Lincoln referrals. The TAT also monitors
(UNL) has successfully implecampus and local police contacts
mented a TAT that has addressed for incidents (e.g., domestic
dozens of situations. It consists
violence, protection orders,
of officers specially trained in
stalking allegations) that may
threat assessment, as well as a
warrant further assessment or
consulting psychologist. Other
monitoring of potential threats
campus personnel (such as those to the campus setting. Additionin human resources and mental
ally, TAT members coordinate
health and student services) par- interventions with other univerticipate on an as-needed basis.
sity services, as well as monitor
The university’s police departsituations as warranted, to
ment has primary responsibility ensure that there is no flare-up of
for the security of the campus
a posed threat. As a key focus,
and properties and the investiga- the TAT has educated and
tion of criminal incidents occur- collaborated with a wide range
ring on university grounds.
of university stakeholder groups.
University stakeholders
CONCLUSION
can make a referral for a threat
assessment when encountering
Colleges and universities
a concerning behavior, and,
strive to attain the noble goal
to a subject are consistent and
“on the same page” to avoid
confusion.
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of making society better. Unfortunately, recent events have
highlighted the reality that not
even these institutions of higher
learning are immune to unthinkable acts.
Of course, campus and law
enforcement authorities want to
address this problem and keep
students, faculty, and others
safe. While all segments of
society, including campuses,
face danger of some sort, by
incorporating effective threat
assessment and management
strategies, officials can put measures in place that will meet this
challenge head-on.
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